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Discussion of George Gillespie's Wholesome Severity Reconciled with Christian Liberty
Magistrates acting in faith 
Subject: Magistrates acting in faith
From: Ben M. 
Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 09:29:49 -0500

The poster of the text and keeper of the order asks (WF: GWS7-9,
Questions for Thought),

> Regarding Piscator's seventh argument: is it correct to use a passage
> dealing with things indifferent (as Romans 14 does) in the church and
> apply it to the magistrate who has a coercive power--remember, nothing
> the magistrate does can be regarded as indifferent in the sense of 
> Romans 14.

Piscator had quoted Rom 14:23, "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin," to
argue that unless the civil magistrate orders his judgments by the law
of God, clearly revealed in the judicial precepts of the Mosaic Law, he
sins because he has no assurance that his action is just.

I believe Piscator's use of this Scripture, and his inference from it,
are correct.


1. Is it proper to apply Rom 14:23 to matters other than those concerned
with causing weak Christians to stumble and wounding their consciences?

Ans.  The fact that the principle "whatsoever is not of faith is sin" is
used in Rom 14 does not mean that the principle is limited to
circumstances like those addressed in Rom 14. The principle is not
derived in the chapter, as if it depended for its definition on what
precedes. Rather it is a general principle that the Apostle applies to
the case described. This is evident because it is introduced by the
conjunction "for." It is wrong to eat meat if one doubts, writes Paul,
"For whatever is not from faith is sin." If he had said, "So, whatever
is not from faith is sin," or "Therefore, whatever is not from faith is
sin," it might appear that he had derived the principle from the
circumstances of the chapter and we would have to look more carefully to
see if it applies generally or not.

This same principle is expressed elsewhere in Scripture, e.g., Js 1:6-8,
Tit 1:15, Heb 10:19,22. The Lord expects us to act in faith in our every
deed--or to refrain. If a person believes that a certain behavior might
constitute sin, yet engages in it anyway, he displays a reckless and
calloused spirit.

There are predicaments in which a person may be involved concerning
which he is so confused as not to know whether to act is sinful, or
whether to refrain is sinful. He cannot act or refrain in faith. One
might object, if the aforementioned principle is admitted, that this
presents a case where the person cannot help but sin. I believe this
case is addressed by Titus 1:15, "To the pure all things are pure, but
to those who are defiled and unbelieving nothing is pure; but even their
mind and conscience are defiled." It is not the circumstances that place
the person in a state of unavoidable sin. It is his own defiled
conscience.


2.  Application of this principle to the civil magistrate in the
execution of the duties of his office.

As an example, let's suppose a judge is confronted with pronouncing
sentence upon a man who has been convicted of performing an abortion on
a woman and a living fetus (the fetus has been killed in the abortion).
The question is, how is the judge, acting in faith, certain that in
pronouncing his verdict he is not violating the Sixth Commandment
himself? If we hold, with the Larger Catechism, that violating the Sixth
Commandment occurs in either of two cases: a) killing when death is not
warranted, b) failing to protect the innocent, then the question divides
into these two branches.

a.  If the judge sentences the abortionist to death, how is the judge
certain that he has not killed the abortionist unwarrantably? A judge
who repudiates the direct applicability of the Mosaic judicial law to
modern jurisprudence has only his own estimation to rest upon. On the
other hand, the judge who views the Mosaic judicial law as warrant and
guide for his particular acts may offer the defense that the man whom he
put to death for committing an abortion was executed in accordance with
God's law (Ex 21:14, 22-23).

b.  If the judge fails to execute the abortionist, how is he certain
that he has not left the innocent unprotected? Perhaps he banishes the
abortionist to a deserted island, and therefore knows that that
particular abortionist will never perform another abortion. But part of
the function of the death penalty is to ensure that the people "hear and
fear, and not again do such wickedness as this among you" (Dt 13:11;
17:13; 19:20; 21:21). The judge is liable to the charge that he has left
the innocent unprotected because the next abortionist has not been
taught fear appropriate to the crime, i.e., "life for life" (Ex 21:23-
25). Finding no biblical justification for what he has done, indeed,
finding much that may speak against him, this judge has no certainty of
the justness of his act. He has not acted in faith.

Similar exercises may be carried out for other crimes, and for questions
regarding others of the Ten Commandments that a civil magistrate may be
violating in his judgments. In fact, a magistrate who does not justify
his judgments by appeal to God's law is subject to enquiry regarding his
keeping of each of the Commandments in every judgment he pronounces. One
who properly adduces Scripture for his judgments puts all enquiries to
rest. To Piscator's point, the grand inquisitor is the man's own heart,
testing his conscience, asking if his deeds are done in faith.

Ben M.