Faith Presbyterian Church Reformed

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Discussion of George Gillespie's Wholesome Severity Reconciled with Christian Liberty

Subject: GWS-18 From: Richard Bacon Date: Sat, 05 Jul 1997 11:23:17 -0500 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Discussion: GWS. Post 18. George Gillespie's Wholesome Severity Reconciled with Christian Liberty The true resolution of a present controversy concerning liberty of conscience. All text for this discussion taken from the edition of this work, Copyright (c) Naphtali Press 1996. Full text available at: http://www.naphtali.com/naphtali +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ [Part III continued. Point 4, liberty of conscience answered.] 4. I have done with the three objections, but I have three words more to speak with the Compassionate Samaritan, in answer to his three arguments for liberty of conscience, in which though all the strength of the discourse does lie, I hope to make him ashamed of them, if he can at all blush. (1.) His first argument is this: "Whatsoever a man's reason does conclude to be true or false, or be agreeable or disagreeable to God's word, that same to that man is his opinion or judgment, and so man is by his own reason necessitated to be of that mind he is: Now where there is a necessity, there ought to be no punishment, for punishment is the recompense of voluntary actions; therefore no man ought to be punished for his judgment." ANSWER. [1.] The question is not whether a man ought to be punished for his judgment, but whether a man ought to be punished for such professions or practices in religion, as are found to be pernicious, hurtful, and destructive, to the glory of God, the truth of the gospel, the ordinances of Christ, the reformation of religion, the peace of the Church. I know he will be ready still to set on foot his argument, for that a man's judgment and reason do so necessitate and conclude him that he cannot choose but profess and practice as he does. Therefore I add, [2.], this argument of his strikes against the justice of the Parliament done or to be done upon Malignants, for as much as their judgment binds them, and their reason necessitates them to judge and speak as they do. [3.] It strikes at the very justice of God upon the reprobate and unbelieving men, for as much as they cannot receive the things of God (1 Cor. 1:14), cannot hear the words of Christ (Jn. 8:43), cannot receive the spirit of truth (Jn. 14:17). But [4.], the formal solution is this: there is a gross fallacy in the argument, for we must distinguish necessity; there is a natural necessity, which takes away the [greek] [power], and a moral necessity, which takes away the [greek] [authority] of a man's being of another judgment or way. Again, there is an absolute necessity, and a hypothetical necessity. Now the necessity of a heretic's judging thus, because his reason concludes him thus, is not a moral necessity or obligation upon him, as if it were not lawful to him to judge or do otherwise (nay, he ought and is bound by the word of God to judge otherwise, and do otherwise), but it is a natural necessity (I mean of sinful nature), and that not simple and absolute, neither, but hypothetical only, and upon this supposition that he has not yet opened his eyes to receive more light, nor set his heart singly and in the fear of God to seek more light. So that the plain English of this Samaritan argument is this: Though God's word binds a man to such a duty, yet if his own erroneous, perverse, and corrupt judgment concludes him so far that his opinion cannot agree with the word of God, and himself cannot be brought to the practice of that necessary duty; such a man ought not to be punished. Or as if one should argue thus: He that has borrowed from me a thousand pounds, has by his own fault disabled himself to pay it; therefore I may not call him to account for it. Dick Bacon Poster of the text and keeper of the order.